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STATE OF NECESSITY AND PEREMPTORY
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT LAW
Dr. Jorge E. Vifiuales*

I.

INTRODUCTION

T is usually assumed that peremptory norms have only a limiting effect with respect to the State of Necessity defense (Necessity),' as
characterized by article 25 of the International Law Commission's
Attorney (New York), Abogado (Argentina), Ph.D. (Sciences Po Paris), LL.M.
(Harvard Law School), D.E.A. in public international law and licence in international relations (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva), D.E.A. in
political theory and licence in political science (University of Geneva), licenciatus
juris (University of Fribourg). Jorge Vifiuales is an international arbitration practitioner based in Geneva (L6vy Kaufmann-Kohler) as well as the Executive Director of the Latin American Society of International Law. The views expressed in
this article are purely personal and do not engage any of the organizations to
which the author is affiliated.
1. On Necessity (and related issues) in international law, see (among other contributions) the following sources: A. CAVAGLIERI, Lo STATO DI NECESSITA NEL DIRrrro INTERNAZIONALE (Athenaeum) (1917); BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK, THE
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928); Edorado Vitta, La
Necessitd nel Diritto Internazionale, 11 RivisTA ITALIANA PER LE SCIENZE GiURIDICHE 288 (1936) (Italy); Paul Weidenbaum, Necessity in InternationalLaw, 24
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 105 (1938); Giuseppe Sperduti, Introduzione allo Studio delle Funzioni della Necessitd nel Diritto Internazionale, 22
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 54 (1943) (Italy); EDOUARD TAWFIK
HAZAN,

L'P-TAT DE NtCESSITIt EN DROIT PENAL INTERPTATIQUE

ET INTERNA-

(P6done) (1949); S. Glaser, Quelques remarques sur l'tt de ndcessit9 en
droit international,6 REVUE DE DROIT PtNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 599 (1952)
(Belg.); L. Buza, The State of Necessity in International Law, 1 ACTA JURIDICA
ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICAE 205 (1959) (Hung.); PAOLA ANNA PILLITU, Lo STATO DI NECESSITA NEL DIRirrO INTERNAZIONALE (UniversitA di Perugia) (1981); Julio Barboza, Necessity (Revisited) in InternationalLaw, in ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 27, 27-43 (Jerzy
Makarczyk ed., 1984); Jean J.A. Salmon, Faut-il codifier l'tat de Ngcessitg en droit
international?,in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS, 235, 235-90 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1984); S.P. Jagota, State Responsibility: Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 249-77
(1985); M.B. Akehurst, InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 3-16
(1985); CESAREO GUTIERREZ ESPADA, EL ESTADO DE NECESIDAD Y EL USO DE
LA FUERZA EN DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (Tecnos) (1987); Roman Boed, State of
Necessity as a Justificationfor Internationally Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 1-43 (2000); Daniel Dobos, The Necessity of Precaution:The
Future of Ecological Necessity and the Precautionary Principle, 13 FORDHAM
ENVTL L.J. 375, 375-408 (2002); Jan Neumann & Elisabeth Turk, Necessity Revisited: Proportionalityin World Trade Organization Law After Korea-Beef, EC-AsTIONAL
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Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Articles). 2 Indeed, Necessity cannot be invoked to justify a violation of a peremptory norm of international law. 3 This article contends that this assumption reflects an
incomplete understanding of the impact of peremptory norms on the development of public international law. Specifically, I argue that peremptory norms have not only a limiting effect, but also what can be referred
to as an "excusing effect," when the essential interests invoked by a state
in support of Necessity are enshrined in peremptory norms. This excusing effect has three main consequences, which I explore in more detail in
what follows. First, states' ability to contractually set aside the public international law defense of Necessity in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT)
is considerably restricted. Second, the conditions that a state must meet
to avail itself of Necessity must be adjusted to take into account the nature of the interests at stake. Third, the preceding two consequences together suggest the existence of a specific form of Necessity.
The awards rendered in two recent cases against Argentina conducted
under the aegis of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), namely CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina
(CMS) and LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina (LG&E),4 offer an interesting set of facts with which to explore these claims. A major reason
why the CMS and LG&E awards have generated considerable commenbestos and EC-Sardines, 37 J.

WORLD

TRADE

199, 199-233 (2003); Andreas

Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State of) Necessity, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
485, 485-526 (2004); Sarah Heathcote, State of Necessity and International Law
(2005) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Graduate Institute of International Studies); Charles Leben, L'6tat de ndcessitg dans le droit international de
l'investissement, 3 LES CAHIERS DE L'ARBITRAGE 47, 47-52 (2005) (Fr.).
2. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 25,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter ILC Articles].
3. Peremptory norms (us cogens) were originally defined by reference to Article 53
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, which runs as
follows: "For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character", see Vienna Convention, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. On the development
of the idea of peremptory norms, see the following sources: Alfred Verdross, Jus
Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 55-63
(1966); Giorgio Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, in 172 RECUEIL
DES COURS DE L'ACADPMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 271, 271-316
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981); LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS
(JUs COGENS)

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA,

PRESENT STATUS (1988); Gennady M. Danilenko, InternationalJus Cogens: Issues
of Law-Making, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 42, 42-65 (1991); ROBERT KOLB, THPORIE DU
Jus COGENS INTERNATIONAL: ESSAI DE RELECTURE DU CONCEPT (Presses
Universitaires de France) (2001).
4. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/
01/8 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award]; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision of Annulment, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept. 25,
2007) [hereinafter CMS Annulment]; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision
on Liability, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter
LG&E Award].
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tary from practitioners and academics alike is that the two tribunals
reached conflicting conclusions on the issue of Necessity, despite similar
factual backgrounds. Indeed, both cases concerned a number of restrictive measures taken by the Argentine government to cope with the economic crisis that unfolded in Argentina starting in late 1999. The
government decided to suspend U.S. Price Producer Index (PPI) tariff
adjustments and freeze gas distribution tariffs, 5 which eventually led investors to initiate arbitration proceedings against Argentina. But while
the CMS tribunal found that Necessity did not avail Argentina, the
LG&E tribunal considered that Argentina had found itself, for a limited
period of time, in a State of Necessity justifying the measures taken upon
the onset of the crisis. Commentary on these awards has mainly focused
on whether economic necessity is admissible under customary international law (or under article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT) or whether
Argentina could follow any other path in coping with the consequences of
the 2001 economic crisis. 6 After the recent decision of the ad hoc committee rendered in the CMS case in late September 2007, the attention
has moved rather to the reasoning followed by the arbitral tribunal to
determine the law governing Necessity.
The question of Necessity in public international law, however, appears
to have deeper implications than those usually analyzed in the literature.
At the very core of Necessity lies a balance between different interests as
well as the unresolved question of whether there might be a hierarchy
between international norms. 7 When the required conditions are met,
5. As the crisis worsened, more restrictive reforms were subsequently adopted by the
Argentine government, in particular a decree imposing controls on foreign
exchange.
6. On the CMS and LG&E awards, see the following sources: David Foster, "Necessity Knows No Law!": LG&E v. Argentina, 9 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 149, 149-55
(2006); Julien Fouret, CMS c/LG&E Ou L'6tat de ndcessit6 en question, 2 REVUE
DE L'ARBITRAGE 249, 249-72 (2007); August Reinisch, Necessity in International
Investment Arbitration:An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases?,
8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 191, 191-214 (2007); Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State's Power to Handle Economic Crises:
Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 265, 26586 (2007).
7. The existence of a hierarchy between different norms of international law has been
widely debated. The two main loci from which the controversy developed are 1)
certain provisions of the Vienna Convention, namely arts. 53 & 64 and 2) a famous
obiter dictum of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1970 Barcelona
Traction case, where the ICJ states:
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them
the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be
drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-A-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
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Necessity precludes the wrongfulness of a state's action 8 because the international legal order (like most domestic orders, under different
names 9) considers that such action was intended to protect an "essential
interest" that is a higher value than the one protected by the norm
breached. 10 In this context, a feature of Necessity, which received little
attention in the awards rendered in CMS and LG&E as well as in subsequent commentary, is its relation with peremptory norms.1 When mentioned, peremptory norms are considered only as a limit, excluding the
availability of Necessity. Insofar as the norm violated by the state invoking Necessity protects an essential interest of the home state 12 and/or is a
peremptory norm, Necessity will not be available. In other words, acts
that result in violations of peremptory norms or of norms protecting a
state's essential interests (as we shall see, the two categories overlap to
some extent, albeit not entirely), cannot be excused on the basis of the
Necessity defense. But peremptory norms are not only the outer limit of
Necessity as a defense but also part of the content of the Necessity defense. In assessing the content of the expression "essential interests" of a
state, as it applies to Necessity, one should start by analyzing those interests that can by no means be subordinated to others. In other words, one
should start with peremptory norms themselves as the core content (but
not the whole content) of the expression "essential interests."
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5)
(second phase). On the hierarchy of the sources of international law, see the following sources: Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International
Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273, 273-85 (1974-75); J.H.H. Weiler & Andreas L.
Paulus, The Structure of Change in InternationalLaw or Is There a Hierarchy of
Norms in InternationalLaw?, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 545, 545-65 (1997); Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 566, 566-82
(1997); Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy
of Norms in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 583, 583-95 (1997); JOOST
PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); Dinah Shelton,

Normative Hierarchy in InternationalLaw, 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 291, 291-323 (2006).
8. On the nature of the defenses included in the ILC Draft Articles (as well as current ILC Articles), see Vaughan Lowe, Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility:
A Plea for Excuses, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 405, 405-11 (1999).
9. In the context of domestic private law, we can refer, for example, to force majeure,
hardship, or the theory of imprevisi6n. The Necessity defense is, at the domestic
level, more often found as an excusing defense in criminal law.
10. The inherent vagueness of the expression "essential interest" has, understandably,
been the object of much scholarly discussion. Commentators have endeavored to
distinguish what qualifies as an "essential interest" from what does not. Regarding, specifically, self-preservation and economic and financial necessity, see
Heathcote, supra note 1, at 201-61.
11. See Foster, supra note 6; Fouret, supra note 6; Reinisch, supra note 6; Schill, supra
note 6.
12. In this article, I adopt the usual characterization of home state (state of which the
investor is a national, where it is incorporated, or where the investor's headquarters are located) and host state (state where the investment is made). In connection with a Necessity situation, I also use the terms "breaching state" (state
invoking Necessity to preclude the wrongfulness of a breach of an international
norm) and "victim state" (state with respect to which an international norm is
breached). In the context of international investment, these categories overlap
with those of the host state and home state, respectively.
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From this perspective, the question of Necessity can be re-stated as follows: was the action taken by the state necessary to avoid an imminent
violation of a peremptory norm of international law? Or should the state
have violated a peremptory norm in order to comply with its obligations
under international law? Which one of these two options must a state
follow when no satisfactory middle ground seems available? 13 The answer to this question would, in my view, provide useful guidance to practitioners of international investment law in addressing the issue of
Necessity in hard cases. Hopefully, it also will contribute to the understanding of how the concept of peremptory norms influences the development of public international law.
This article attempts to provide an interpretation of Necessity from the
perspective of the broader question as to the existence of a hierarchy
among international norms, as it stems from the very concept of peremptory norms. The analysis is structured into three parts. The first part
deals with the legal concept of Necessity in light of the CMS and LG&E
awards. Because these awards have received considerable attention in
the legal literature,' 4 I focus only on a limited number of noteworthy issues. The second part focuses on one aspect of the relation between Necessity and peremptory norms, namely the limiting effect of peremptory
norms. I outline four possible scenarios according to the nature of the
interests invoked by the home and the host state, respectively. This discussion foreshadows the object of the third and final part, which explores
the idea of an excusing effect of peremptory norms, paying particular attention to its practical implications for the availability of Necessity as a
defense.
II.

NECESSITY IN THE CMS AND LG&E ARBITRAL AWARDS

At the root of the divergent conclusions in the CMS and LG&E
awards lie contrasting assessments of the factual situation in Argentina at
the time the measures were taken as well as, to some extent, a divergence
as to the content of the applicable law. The purpose of the present section is to analyze three features of the CMS and LG&E awards, namely
each tribunal's understanding of the law governing Necessity, its legal assessment of the facts, and the way the concept of peremptory norms informs the two awards. These three features all impinge on the way the
two tribunals envisioned the Necessity defense, particularly with regard
to the concept of essential interests.
13. Even when a middle ground may exist (such as a lesser impairment of a state's
obligations under a BIT), in the context of an investment dispute, the legal characterization will lead either to the legality or the illegality of the conduct. Legal
middle grounds such as those suggested by Professor Vaughan Lowe remain, for
the time being, under-theorized. Cf. Lowe, supra note 8. One aim of the present
article is to contribute to the conceptual clarification of this grey zone of international law.
14. See Foster, supranote 6; Fouret, supra note 6; Reinisch, supra note 6; Schill, supra
note 6.
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Let me deal first with the way each tribunal understands the law governing Necessity. The treatment of this point in the two cases differs in its
form and, to some extent, in its substance. Regarding form, the CMS
tribunal starts with a discussion of Necessity under customary international law (as reflected by article 25 of the ILC Articles) and then pursues
its analysis of Necessity under article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.15
Conversely, the LG&E tribunal focuses first on article XI of the U.S.Argentina BIT before undertaking, only for the purpose of buttressing its
argumentation, a discussion of article 25 of the ILC Articles. While the
CMS tribunal uses separate sections for each discussion, the LG&E uses
the same section for both discussions. Despite the clearer structure of the
CMS award on this point, the relation between the two legal bases (custom and treaty law) for assessing Necessity is more explicitly articulated
in the LG&E award. Indeed, while the CMS award applies part of the
test of the customary rule on Necessity to assess Necessity under article
XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, without spelling out the reasons for doing
so,16 the LG&E award clearly specifies in its paragraph 245 that the customary international law of Necessity only intervenes to confirm a conclusion already reached on the basis of article XI of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. 17 The difference is significant, as the conditions set forth by each of
15. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14,1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina
BIT]. Article XI states, "This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of
its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests." The
CMS tribunal also discusses the idea of Necessity under Argentine law, as it stems
from the teorfa de la imprevisi6n provided for in article 1198 of the Argentine Civil
Code. See COD. Civ. art. 1198 (Arg.), http://www.redetel.gov.ar/Normativa/
Archivos%20de%2ONormas/CodigoCivil.htm.
16. See, in particular, paragraphs 357-58 of the award. In the section devoted to the
tribunal's findings in respect of the treaty's clauses on emergency, the tribunal undertakes to analyze one of the customary conditions for Necessity, which was not
required by article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT:
357. A second issue the Tribunal must determine is whether, as discussed
in the context of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility, the
act in question does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
or States towards which the obligation exists.... 358 .... For the purpose
of this case, and looking at the Treaty just in the context of its States
parties, the Tribunal concludes that it does not appear that an essential
interest of the State to which the obligation exists has been impaired, nor
have those of the international community as a whole. Accordingly, the
plea of necessity would not be precluded on this count.
CMS Award, supra note 4,
357-58. Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT does
not mention this condition. Section II of this article shows that only contrariety to
peremptory norms would render this condition applicable to some extent.
17. The LG&E tribunal stated:
In the previous analysis, the Tribunal has determined that the conditions
in Argentina from 1 December 2001 until 26 April 2003 were such that
Argentina is excused from liability for the alleged violation of its Treaty
obligations due to the responsive measures it enacted. The concept of
excusing a State for the responsibility for violation of its international
obligations during what is called a 'state of necessity' or 'state of emergency' also exists in international law. While the Tribunal considers that
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these two formulations of the Necessity defense are not the same. It is
important to note that the LG&E tribunal formally decided the question
of Necessity on the basis of article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, whereas
the CMS tribunal applied the full test of article 25 of the ILC Articles,
taking the stance that a number of conditions not expressly mentioned in
article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT had to be completed by those set
forth in customary law. 18 This was severely criticized in the decision of
the ad hoc committee. Indeed, the committee found that the reasoning of
the CMS tribunal was deficient on this point, to the extent that the requirements set for the application of article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT
must not be equated with those provided for in article 25 of the ILC
Articles. 19
Regarding the legal assessment of the facts, the analysis of the Argentine crisis provided by the CMS award is less detailed than the one provided by the LG&E award, in particular with respect to the potential
tension between competing interests. Paragraphs 319 to 321 of the CMS
award set out to analyze whether an essential interest, in the sense of
customary international law, was involved in the matter. But the tribunal's actual appraisal of the situation is unclear:
The Tribunal is convinced that the crisis was indeed severe and the
argument that nothing important happened is not tenable. However,
neither could it be held that wrongfulness should be precluded as a
matter of course under the circumstances. As is many times the case
the protectionsafforded by Article XI have been triggeredin this case, and
are sufficient to excuse Argentina's liability, the Tribunal recognizes that
satisfaction of the state of necessity standard as it exists in international
law (reflected in Article 25 of the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility) supports the Tribunal's conclusion.
LG&E Award, supra note 4, 245 (emphasis added). Thus, the conditions set
forth in article 25 of the ILC Articles are only used to confirm and not to decide
the claim. See id. 258. This fact is consistent with the way the tribunal had set out
to use the different legal sources involved:
The Tribunal reiterates that to carry out the two-fold analysis already
mentioned, it shall apply first, the Treaty, second, the general international law to the extent that is necessary and third, the Argentine domestic law. The Tribunal underscores that the claims and defenses mentioned
derive from the Treaty and that, to the extent required for the interpretation and application of its provisions, the general international law
should be applied.
LG&E Award, supra note 4, 206.
18. See CMS Award supra note 4, 383 (relating to the applicability of the rule of
article 27 of the ILC Articles to article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT).
19. The ad hoc committee stated:
131. Those two texts having different operation and content, it was necessary for the Tribunal to take a position on their relationship and to
decide whether they were both applicable in the present case. The Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis, simply assuming that Article XI
and Article 25 are on the same footing. 132. In doing so the Tribunal
made another error of law. One could wonder whether state of necessity
in international law goes to the issue of wrongfulness or that of responsibility. But in any case, the excuse based on customary international law
could only be subsidiary to the exclusion based on Article XI.
CMS Annulment, supra note 4, 1$ 131-32.
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in international affairs and international law, situations of this kind
are not given in black and white but in many shades of grey. .. It
follows that the relative effect that can be reasonably attributed to
the crisis does
not allow for a finding on preclusion of
20
wrongfulness.
The remarks of the CMS tribunal with respect to article XI of the U.S.Argentina BIT are more developed. 21 It is stated that, even if the concept of essential security interest used in article XI of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT covers above all situations of war, armed conflict, or disturbance, this
fact does not preclude the possibility that an economic crisis might, under
some circumstances, affect a state so as to trigger the protection of this
article. This interpretation seems accurate but could have been more
fully developed. It is true that, as mentioned in paragraph 15 the ILC
Commentary, 2 2 the extent to which a given interest is "essential" cannot
be pre-determined and will depend on the circumstances of the case. But
the tribunal was confronted with specific circumstances and could have
made a determination on this issue. The LG&E award is, in this respect,
more precise regardless of whether one agrees with its decision on this
point. As noted before, the tribunal specifically assessed the situation in
light of article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT,23 referring to article 25 of
the ILC Articles for mere confirmation purposes. 24 As in CMS, the
LG&E tribunal stressed that severe economic crises may qualify for the
25
level of protection granted by article XI to essential security interests.
But the tribunal went further in its assessment of the situation, mentioning different types of essential interests that were in danger under the
26
circumstances. Among these interests are not only economic hardship
but also more fundamental interests of the Argentine population, such as
access to food and to basic medical supplies. 27 This assessment is particu20. CMS Award, supra note 4, TT 320-21.
21. See id. T[ 359-65.
22. UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL LAW

COMMISSION, COMMENTARY TO THE ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTs,

art. 25, cmt. 15 [hereinafter 2001 ILC COMMENTARY].

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See LG&E Award, supra note 4,
230-37.
See id. [ 251-52; see also CMS Award, supra note 4.
See LG&E Award, supra note 4, 238.
See id. 91 232-33 & 235-36.
The LG&E tribunal stated:
The entire healthcare system teetered on the brink of collapse. Prices of
pharmaceuticals soared as the country plunged deeper into the deflationary period, becoming unavailable for low-income people. Hospitals suffered a sever shortage of basic supplies. Investments in infrastructure
and equipment for public hospitals declined as never before. These conditions prompted the Government to declare the nationwide health
emergency to ensure the population's access to basic health care goods
and services. At the time, one quarter of the population could not afford
the minimum amount of food required to ensure their subsistence.
Given the level of poverty and lack of access to healthcare and proper
nutrition, disease followed.
Id. 234. One may, of course, argue that this problem was not directly related to
gas distribution. But a powerful counter-argument would be that the assessment
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larly interesting because it implicitly suggests the existence of different
levels even within the black-box of essential security interests.
This latter observation leads to my third point, namely that despite the
type of interests identified in the LG&E award, neither the LG&E nor
the CMS tribunal characterized the situation in which Argentina found
itself after 2001 by reference to peremptory norms. Although the terms
"essential interest" and "essential security interests" are repeatedly used
in the awards, peremptory norms are not explicitly used to assess the situation in which the Argentine government acted. With regard to the ILC
Commentary, upon which the two awards rely heavily, it expressly states
that essential interests cannot be defined abstractly. 28 In an earlier version of the commentary, which remains relevant for this purpose, it was
noted that the international legal order has evolved and that the introduction of the concept of peremptory norms is part of this evolution. 29 Despite that express reference to peremptory norms in this version of the
commentary only relates to their limiting effect, 30 some implicit support
for the idea that an excusing effect of peremptory norms can be derived
from the reference to the evolving character of international law. According to this rationale, the legal concept of essential interests should
evolve with the development of international law, in a way analogous to
that applicable to the concept of domaine rdservg, although in the opposite direction. Indeed, while the domaine rdserv6 of the state tends to
shrink with the development of international law, 31 as new norms such as
human rights set new limits on state action, the concept of essential interests is progressively filled in, as the recognition of paramount interests
enshrined in peremptory norms develops.
of such a crisis cannot be segmented by specific companies or even sectors, for
socio-economic crises involve a large array of interconnected causes and
consequences.
28. 2001 ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 22, art. 25, cmt. 15.
29. Commenting on the famous "Caroline" case, it has been stated:
For the State organs and for the writers of the time, it made no difference, with regard to the possibility of invoking a state of necessity,
whether the obligation with which the act of the State was not in conformity was or was not an obligation relating to respect for territorial
sovereignty. But can the same be said today? Apart from doubt on the
question whether all international obligations concerning respect for the
territorial sovereignty of States have really become obligations of jus
cogens, it must be borne in mind that Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations requires Member States to refrain from the use
of force 'against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.'
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, COMMENTARY TO THE
DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, ART. 33, CMT. 24 [hereinafter 1996 ILC COMMENTARY].

30. See id. art. 33, cmts. 22, 28, 37 & 41.
31. Already in 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) had noted,

"The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of
a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of
international relations." Nationality Decrees in Tunisia and Morocco, Advisory

Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7).
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The preceding considerations suggest that the question of the relation
between peremptory norms and essential interests of states needs further
elaboration. The ILC Articles provide a first element towards this endeavor in article 25, section 1(b) in fine and in article 26. According to
these provisions, no essential interest of a state can be upheld to preclude
the wrongfulness of a violation of a peremptory norm (or of a norm protecting the interests of the international community as a whole). The rationale for this had been explained in paragraph 37 of the commentary to
the former ILC Draft Articles (1996), still relevant in this regard:
This obviously means that peremptory rules are so essential for the
life of the international community as to make it all the more inconceivable that a State should be entitled to decide unilaterally, however acute the state of necessity which overtakes it, that it may
commit a breach of the obligations which these rules impose on it.32
This explanation was retained in the current commentary with regard to
article 26:
It is... desirable to make it clear that the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness in Chapter V of Part One do not authorize or excuse
any derogation from a peremptory norm of general international
law.... The plea of
necessity likewise cannot excuse the breach of a
peremptory norm. 33
Let me elaborate conceptually on this remark. The values enshrined in
peremptory norms are, by definition, recognized as essential interests of
all states. But other values may be essential without qualifying as peremptory norms, either with respect to all states or only to a specific state.
The values that amount to essential interests are therefore not exactly the
same as those enshrined in peremptory norms. If an interest is essential
to all states, that means, from a legal standpoint, that either the international norm protecting this interest is a peremptory norm or that the interest is merely essential in a general way.34 Interests enshrined in
32. 1996 ILC

COMMENTARY, supra note 29, art. 33, cmt. 37.
33. 2001 ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 22, art. 26, cmt. 4.
34. The primary norms set forth in multilateral conventions on human rights or humanitarian law may at the least be considered as enshrining general essential interests and perhaps even amount to peremptory norms. The difference between
general essential interests and peremptory norms seems to underlie the separate
treatment of international obligations which exclude the possibility of invoking
Necessity (article 25 of the ILC Articles) and peremptory norms (article 26 of the
ILC Articles). The 2001 ILC Commentary to article 25 (comment 19) briefly refers to humanitarian conventions expressly excluding military necessity. For a
more developed treatment of this point, refer to the commentary to the former
1996 ILC Commentary to article 33, which states:
The Commission does not believe that the existence of a situation of necessity of the kind indicated can permit a State to disobey one of the
abovementioned rules of humanitarian law. In the first place, some of
these rules are, in the opinion of the Commission, rules which impose
obligations of jus cogens, and as stated below, a state of necessity cannot
be invoked to justify non-fulfilment of one of these obligations. In the
second place, even in regard to obligations of humanitarian law which
are not obligations of jus cogens, it must be borne in mind that to admit
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peremptory norms are therefore only part of the content of the expression essential interests. Hence, two discussions must be distinguished.
On the one hand, we have the classic discussion that focuses on the outer
limits of the concept of essential interests. On the other hand, one can
identify the contours of new discussion, which would get into the blackbox to explore the relationship between different values that are all encompassed by the concept of essential interests.
The relation between Necessity and peremptory norms is heavily dependent upon this second discussion. As I will try to show, this relationship has two aspects. First, peremptory norms operate as a limitation to
the availability of the Necessity defense. Second, peremptory norms give
content to the expression "essential interests," in which case Necessity
presents particular features.
III.

THE LIMITING EFFECT OF PEREMPTORY NORMS

Article 25, section 1(b) of the ILC Articles addresses one aspect of the
relation between the interests of the breaching state and those of the victim state. 35 A literal reading of this provision would suggest that if the
interests of both states qualify as essential, then there can be no Necessity
precluding the wrongfulness of the breach. Upon closer scrutiny, how36
ever, at least four different scenarios appear to be possible.
The first and simplest scenario concerns the situation in which both
states invoke interests qualifying as essential, neither one amounting to
an interest enshrined in a peremptory norm. For example, suppose both
states are undergoing an economic crisis in which presumably essential
interests of both states are deemed to be at stake. In this case, the Necessity defense would be excluded by virtue of the express limitation in article 25, sectionl(b) of the ILC Articles. In the second scenario, the
breaching state invokes an essential interest not enshrined in a perempthe possibility of not fulfilling the obligations imposing limitations on the
method of conducting hostilities whenever a belligerent found it necessary to resort to such means in order to ensure the success of a military
operation would be tantamount to accepting a principle which is in absolute contradiction with the purposes of the legal instruments drawn up.
The rules of humanitarian law relating to the conduct of military operations were adopted in full awareness of the fact that 'military necessity'
was the very criterion of that conduct.
1996 ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, art. 33, cmt. 28. Thus, some rules of international humanitarian law may be generally essential without necessarily qualifying as peremptory norms. Part III of this article shows the differences between
these two qualifications.
35. Article 25(1)(b) of the ILC Articles, in relevant part, reads:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: . .. (b) does not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
ILC Articles, supra note 2, art. 25(1)(b).
36. The number of different scenarios will depend upon the hierarchical levels recognized within the overall concept of essential interests.
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tory norm, whereas the victim state invokes one enshrined in a peremptory norm. This is the basic situation envisaged by article 26 of the ILC
Articles. 37 Necessity is expressly excluded. A third scenario would arise
when both the breaching state and the victim state invoke an interest
enshrined in a peremptory norm. Article 26 of the ILC Articles would
again exclude Necessity, although from the standpoint of principle, this
situation constitutes a dilemma. This scenario illustrates the idea that
peremptory norms may operate as both the very core of essential interests and the absolute limits of Necessity, and that, as a consequence, they
can in no way be legally jeopardized. 38 One may ask, however, whether
the internal periphery of the concept of essential interests, namely those
that are not enshrined in peremptory norms, may be subordinated to
higher interests? This leads me to the fourth scenario. In the fourth scenario, the breaching state invokes an essential interest enshrined in a peremptory norm, while the victim state invokes one that qualifies as a mere
essential interest. A literal reading of article 25, sectionl(b) would lead
to the unavailability of Necessity. But this would imply that the breaching state would be legally required to comply with the norm protecting
the other state's essential interest, even to the detriment of a peremptory
norm. There seems to be some room here for a differing interpretation,
according to which Necessity would be available. If this were not the
case, article 25 would legally comfort a situation where a value enshrined
in a peremptory norm is subordinated to a value protected by a hierarchically inferior norm-a hypothesis contrary to the very concept of peremptory norms. Of course, considerations of equity may require that

37. Article 26 of the ILC Articles reads, "Nothing in this Chapter precludes the
wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation
arising under a peremptory norm of general international law." Id. art. 26.
38. The term "legally jeopardized" must be noted for it represents the main reason
why Necessity cannot be upheld as a defense in this case. The peremptory norm
invoked by the breaching state is not legally but factually jeopardized in this case.
What the international legal order seems no longer ready to accept is a situation in
which a legal device is used to validly derogate a peremptory norm. Of course, the
very existence of a dilemma means that, as Necessity is not available in this case,
the breaching state will be compelled to indirectly breach the peremptory norm it
invokes. I would like to make three comments on this issue. First, in some cases
the peremptory norm will envision an exception to itself based on the paramount
importance of the interest of the counterparty. For example, the peremptory norm
banning the use of force in international law has at least two exceptions, self-defense and U.N. enforcement action. States acting on the basis of either of these
two exceptions would not need to invoke Necessity to assert the legality of their
action. One could, to some extent, view self-defense as a specific case of Necessity.
Second, situations in which there exist a real dilemma between two peremptory
norms and which are not covered by an exception of the sort just described are
extremely rare in practice. They represent exceptional situations that cannot even
be approached on the basis of norms specifically created to deal with exceptions.
Third, the theory of peremptory norms seems to suggest that no contradiction may
exist between norms that qualify as peremptory. More precisely, such norms
should be conceptualized in such a way as to be compatible with each other. See
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 105 (2006) (dealing with political values).

2008]

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

compensation for such breaches be adapted in a special way. 39
This latter scenario represents a useful conceptual device, for it takes to
the extreme the implications of the concept of peremptory norms on the
issue of Necessity. Specifically, it provides an analytical bridge to move
from the limiting effect of peremptory norms on to their excusing effect.
Before turning to this other effect, let me note a number of issues arising
out of the CMS and LG&E awards that seem interesting for the present
discussion. As already noted, peremptory norms are not expressly mentioned in the LG&E award and only briefly mentioned in the CMS
award. Paragraph 325 of the CMS award notes: "It does not appear...
that the essential interest of the international community as a whole was
affected in any relevant way, nor that a peremptory norm of international
law might have been compromised, a situation governed by Article 26 of
the Articles. ''40 This paragraph calls for at least three remarks. First, the
CMS tribunal suggests that there may be a difference between the essential interests of the international community and interests protected by
peremptory norms. I have already noted that interests considered generally essential are not necessarily peremptory norms. 4 1 The first category
of norms could include international humanitarian standards, 42 health
and sanitary standards, 43 and perhaps also labor 44 and/or environmental
standards. 45 Admittedly, a gravity threshold would be needed in order to
prevent such standards from becoming an excuse to neutralize the Necessity defense or, conversely, from becoming an easy exit strategy from international obligations. The second category would include norms such
as the prohibition on the use of force, the ban on crimes against humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or gross
39. This issue falls under the scope of article 27(b) of the ILC Articles. See ILC Articles, supra note 2, art. 27(b). On the specifics of compensation in case of Necessity, see: Sergey Ripinsky, State of Necessity: Effect on Compensation, in 4
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, 1, 1-17, (2007).

40.
41.
42.
43.

CMS Award, supra note 4, 325.
See ILC Articles, supra note 2, art. 25.
See id.
Such interests are expressly recognized in the WTO context, under article XX of
the GATT (1947). On the manner in which Necessity operates in the WTO context, see the following sources: M. Hilf & S. Puth, The Principleof Proportionality
on its Way into WTO/GATT Law, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HON-

OUR OF CLAus-DIETER EHLERMANN 199 (Arnim Von Bogdandy, Petros C.
Mavroidis, & Yves Mdny eds., 2002); Axel Desmedt, Proportionalityin WTO Law,
4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 441 (2001); Deborah Akoth Osiro, GATT/WTO Necessity
Analysis: Evolutionary Interpretationand its Impact on the Anatomy of Domestic
Regulation, 29 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 123 (2002); Neumann &
Turk, supra note 1, at 199.
44. On the nature of basic labor standards, see Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy,
Child Labor, Trade, and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International
Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663 (1997).
45. For example, in 1996, the ILC Commentary to article 19 linked environmental
standards to the concept of peremptory norms. 1996 ILC COMMENTARY, supra
note 29, art, 19, cmts. 15-17. On the issue of ecological Necessity, as it was raised
by Hungary before the ICJ in the case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, see Dobos, supra note 1, at 375.
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human rights violations. 46 An intermediate category would include those
obligations considered erga omnes, namely those that must be respected
by all states. 4 7 As I have already suggested, different qualifications may
entail different interactions within the black-box of essential interests.
The three categories seem, however, to have a limiting effect. This view
is of course uncontroversial, but only insofar as a scenario-four-type situation is not taken into account.
The second remark concerns the CMS tribunal's assertion that, in that
case, no essential interests or peremptory norms were at stake from the
perspective of either the victim state (i.e. the US) or the international
community. This point is interesting because it suggests that investment
arbitrations rarely touch upon essential interests of the victim state. This
conclusion is intuitive insofar as the claimants in such proceedings are not
states but private parties, and the link between the interests of such private parties and the essential interests of their home state is usually tenuous. But one could think of some situations in which an investment
dispute may threaten an arguably essential interest of the victim state or
the international community or a peremptory norm. For example, consider the nationalization of a foreign company whose activities represent
the only source of natural resources necessary to supply basic services
(water, electricity, etc.) to the population of the home state. This situation is not necessarily an academic example, as suggested by the recent
debates on the limitation of foreign investment in strategic industries of
the home state. Such regulations may indeed entail a violation of the
equal treatment clause included in many BITs in circumstances that
would not necessarily be covered by clauses reserving essential security
48
interests or by the general Necessity defense.
46. See infra note 52.
47. Although this category is often equated with peremptory norms, there are cases in
which a clear distinction can be drawn. See Lowe, supra note 8. For example, the
international personality of the United Nations organization has been deemed opposable erga omnes. Reparation for Injuries Suffered at Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr.). This element seems important in
view of the powers conferred on the organization. On the distinction between
peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes, see the following sources: Andre
De Hoogh, The Relationship Between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and
International Crimes: Peremptory Norms in Perspective, 42 AusTRIA J. PUB. &
INT'L L. 183 (1991); Michael Byers, Conceptualizingthe Relationship Between Jus
Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 211 (1997).
48. Article 3(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty provides language
that "Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion ... of investments in its territory." Model Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-[State], art. 3(1) (2004), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Secrets/
Investment/ModelBIT/asset-upload-file6897.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
This debate has revolved around the potential acquisition, by state-controlled foreign investors, of companies active in industries in which the home state has a
strategic interest. The U.S. Congress recently enacted the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act on July 26, 2007. Foreign Investment and National Security
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007).
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The third and final remark, and perhaps the most obvious one, is that
the tribunal in CMS only contemplates the limiting effect of peremptory
norms. Peremptory norms play no other role, either explicitly or implicitly, in the reasoning of the tribunal. This point is not devoid of relevance
to the result reached by the tribunal. In fact, I will argue that, from a
conceptual standpoint, it partly explains the contrasting way in which the
CMS and LG&E tribunals analyzed the Argentine crisis. Indeed, as I
will argue next, despite the absence of any express mention of peremptory norms in the LG&E award, the LG&E tribunal did refer to this
concept implicitly in its limiting and excusing dimensions.
IV. THE EXCUSING EFFECT OF PEREMPTORY NORMS
A.

ACTUAL CONFLICTS VS. SUPERVENING CONFLICTS

Peremptory norms aim to preserve, in all circumstances, certain values
considered to be of paramount importance to the international community. In order to perform this function, they must be hierarchically superior to other norms of domestic and/or international law. This hierarchy
is not based on the specific source from which peremptory norms stem
but rather on the values they protect. 49 As a consequence, there is no
settled methodology to identify the norms of international law that qualify as peremptory norms. Understandably, international lawyers tend to
refer, in this matter, to the decisions of international tribunals, in particular those of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).5 0 There is, however,
no guarantee that the ICJ's sometimes ambiguous qualifications provide
accurate guidance.
The way in which peremptory norms exert their overriding or invalidating effects depends, necessarily, upon the legal context in which they operate. In the context of the law of treaties, their effects are explicitly
stated in articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The invalidating effects of these two provisions, although apparently clear on their
49. See Lowe, supra note 8; Prosper Weil, Vers une normativit6 relative en droit interna-

tional public?, 86 REVUE

GIN8RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 5 (1982);

Danilenko, supra note 3, at 42.
50. The case law of the ICJ offers considerable guidance on the contents of what
norms qualify as jus cogens. See Barcelona Traction, Light, & Power, supra note 7,
§ 34 (referring to norms banning acts of aggression and genocide as well as to
norms protecting fundamental rights, including the ban on slavery and racial discrimination); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, § 88 (May 24) (referring to the imperative nature of obligations stemming from diplomatic and consular law); Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, § 90 (June 27) (referring to
the ban on the unauthorized use of force as part of jus cogens); East Timor (Port.
v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, § 29 (June 30) (referring to the right of peoples to selfdetermination as erga omnes); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, § 79 (July 8) (referring to "great many rules of
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict" as "intransgressible principles of
international customary law"). It must be noted, however, that in some cases, it is
rather unclear whether an obligation erga omnes qualifies as a peremptory norm.
While this is, for example, clear for the norm banning genocide, it is still to be
confirmed with regard to the right of peoples to self-determination.
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face, require further elaboration. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
lays out a sort of "ordre public" at the international level. According to
this provision:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character. 5 1
In this regard, it is usually considered that the relevant peremptory norm
must exist at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. But it is not clear
what the term "conflicts" precisely means. For the purposes of this discussion, suffice it to say that the conflict must, in principle, be an actual
conflict, i.e., it must stem from the text of the treaty or from an interpretation of this text in conformity with the interpretation rules laid out in
articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention. One obvious example illustrating this type of case would be an offensive (as opposed to a defensive)
military alliance between two or more countries against one or more
other countries or a treaty regarding slave trade. Because slave trade and
the use of force 52 are banned by peremptory norms, such treaties would
be void. Specifically, a state would not engage its responsibility for
breaching its obligations under such a treaty and private parties could not
derive any legal consequences whatsoever from the existence of this
treaty.
In the field of foreign investment, the question would be whether the
text of this or that BIT would on its face conflict with this or that peremptory norm. Aside from very special cases, one may reasonably take as a
starting point that, as a rule, BITs in the form of the U.S. or Canadian
Model BITs are not prima facie in conflict with peremptory norms. But
this does not mean that the existence of peremptory norms has little relevance for analyzing how BITs operate in practice. Indeed, even in those
cases in which a treaty is prima facie in conformity with peremptory
norms, conflicts may potentially arise if a new peremptory norm (contrary to the text of the treaty) comes into being or when the actual implementation of a treaty conflicts with an existing peremptory norm. Such
conflicts may be referred to as supervening conflicts.

51. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 53.
52. Two uncontroversial exceptions apply: 1) enforcement action ordered or authorized by the U.N. Security Council, under chapter VII of the U.N. Charters and 2)
self-defense. Other possible exceptions, still extremely controversial in contempo-

rary international law, are the use of force within the context of a person's exercise
of his right to self-determination and humanitarian armed intervention.
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B.

SUPERVENING CONFLICTS

As previously noted, supervening conflicts between a treaty and one or
more peremptory norms may arise in two contexts. First, a new peremptory norm may override the content of a treaty. Second, the normal performance of the treaty obligations (as ordinarily interpreted) may, under
some circumstances, conflict with an existing peremptory norm. I shall

analyze these two cases in order of complexity.
The first case is contemplated in article 64 of the Vienna Convention,
which reads: "If a new peremptory norm of general international law
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes
void and terminates. ' '53 This provision expressly acknowledges that international law is an evolving realm and that conduct permitted at one point
in time may become banned at a later time. The emergence and development of the ban on the use of force is but one obvious example. Thus,
while a treaty laying out an offensive alliance was legally valid during the
nineteenth century, today such an alliance would be legally void. Other,
perhaps more relevant, examples may involve treaties running against environmental and/or labor standards whose status as peremptory norms is
still ambiguous but may be affirmed in the future. Indeed, albeit not settled, it seems arguable that the application of a treaty relating to the exploitation of endangered species or to the exchange of foreign workers
under lower labor standards than those internationally recognized could
be challenged before national or international courts. These illustrations
come much closer to how the protection provided by a BIT could be set
aside by a court on the basis of peremptory norms. Of course, such environmental and/or labor restrictions are often taken into account in the
text of BITs. 54 But it is far from clear whether the restrictions contemplated in the relevant provisions of such treaties cover all or even most
international standards.
The second case is more complex. It concerns treaties concluded in
perfect conformity with peremptory norms but whose implementation
under specific circumstances seems to conflict with peremptory norms.
These specific circumstances include, of course, Necessity. One illustration of this second case, particularly relevant from a practitioner's standpoint, concerns the validity of a BIT clause excluding the invocation of
Necessity. A priorithere is no reason why ordinary rules of international
customary law, such as those governing Necessity, could not be set aside
by treaty. Such a clause would only be invalid if it could be established
that the rules governing Necessity cannot be derogated by treaty. Except
for those rules related to peremptory norms, however, there are no reasons to believe that the customary international law of state responsibility
53. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 64.
54. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 48, arts. 12-13; Canada Model Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-[State], art. 11 (2004), http://www.
sice.oas.org/Investment/NatLeg/Can/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter Canadian Model BIT].
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benefits from an imperative character. 55 In this line of thought, Necessity
could a priori be derogated, but such derogation would have no effect
when the Necessity defense operates to uphold the application of a peremptory norm. Specifically, if the breaching state can justify the breach
by referring to the need to abide by a peremptory norm, then a clause
excluding the Necessity defense in all cases, including those in which peremptory norms are at stake, would not be fully valid. It would only be
valid to the extent that it excludes the invocation of Necessity in cases in
which the breach is not excused by the need to uphold a peremptory
norm. Such a conflict is both actual and supervening in some respects.
But insofar as the relevant clause seems prima facie valid, it seems more
56
appropriate to analyze it as a supervening conflict.
55. Even provisions in human rights treaties may be derogated in the event of public
emergency. For example, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with their other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion
or social origin.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. But even under such conditions, no derogation is admissible with respect to certain core human rights identified in article 4(2): "No
derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be
made under this provision." Id. 2. The rights concerned by this provision include
the right to life, the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, the prohibition of slavery and servitude, the prohibition
of imprisonment for contractual debts, the "nullum crimen nulla pena sine lege"
principle, the right to recognition as a person before the law, and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Moreover, there are other obligations
based on customary law that, according the Human Rights Committee, belong to
the human rights core and are excluded from derogation. Cf. Human Rights Committee, general comment 29, paragraph 11. It should be noted that, in the current
state of development of public international law, only massive violations of human
rights seem to be banned by a peremptory norm. See discussion supra note 51.
56. Of course, a major issue in all these illustrations is severability. Article 26 of ILC
Commentary starts its discussion with the issue of severability, quoting the Special
Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Fitzmaurice:
A treaty obligation the observance of which is incompatible with a new
rule or prohibition of international law in the nature of jus cogens will
justify (and require) non observance of any treaty obligation involving
such incompatibility ...The same principle is applicable where circumstances arise subsequent to the conclusion of a treaty, bringing into play
an existing rule of international law which was not relevant to the situation as it existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.

2001 ILC

COMMENTARY,

supra note 22, art. 26, cmt. 2. The ILC Commentary

continues:
In theory one might envisage a conflict arising on a subsequent occasion
between a treaty obligation, apparently lawful on its face and innocent in
its purpose, and a peremptory norm. If such a case were to arise it would
be too much to invalidate the treaty as a whole merely because its application in the given case was not foreseen. But in practice such situations
seem not to have occurred. Even if they were to arise, peremptory
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Beyond the specific context of a treaty clause excluding Necessity, this
analysis suggests that a state may find itself in a situation where it has the
responsibility to protect its population from a specific threat or disaster,
even if the actions that should be reasonably taken run counter to other
international obligations of the state. In such a situation, the state faces
something close to a dilemma. Two or more competing (or mutually exclusive) obligations 57 require from the state courses of action incompatible with each other. Some of these obligations may be clearly stated in,
say, the black letter of a BIT. The problem with Necessity is, however,
that it does not clearly state the obligations that stand on the other end.
This point has often been neglected. Necessity is based on a hierarchy of
values enshrined in international norms. If one identifies the norms that
should stand on the other end, it seems difficult not to start with peremptory norms. Admittedly, peremptory norms may not be the whole story,
but they are at least part of the story. Other norms may also intervene as
contenders of BITs or of other obligations. But one can hardly proceed
to a weighing of the interests at play in a Necessity situation if the norms
that enshrine such interests are not clearly identified and characterized.
C. A

SPECIFIC FORM OF NECESSITY

A government facing a situation of Necessity, such as the one described
in the preceding paragraph, will face the following choice: 1) either pursue a policy that, although contrary to the obligations arising out of a
BIT, maximizes the probability that the value enshrined in a peremptory
norm will be preserved as fully as possible, or 2) simply stick to its BIT
obligations, no matter the effects on the values preserved by peremptory
norms. Such perspective is closely connected with the condition requiring
that, for Necessity to be admissible, there must be no other choice for the
state but to breach its obligations under the BIT. One may wonder what
this condition actually requires from states. In practice, decision-makers
will have a number of options available, 58 none of which will provide total certainty that the goal pursued will be attained, but rather each will
norms of general international law generate strong interpretative principles which will resolve all or most apparent conflicts.
Id. cmt. 3 (emphasis added). The issue of severability has been much studied in
the context of invalid reservations to treaties. See Roberto Baratta, Should Invalid
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties be Disregarded?,11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 413-25
(2000); Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State
Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (2002).
57. The competing values (and the norms in which they are enshrined) would be related to each other in the form of a zero-sum game.
58. Availability in this case should not mean theoretical availability. Decision-makers
will normally have a limited number of possible courses of action in their minds,
some of which they have perhaps already tested in the past (or have been tested
somewhere else), while others will just come to their minds as mere theoretical
options. The law of Necessity cannot require decision-makers to follow theoretical, untested courses of action or even courses of action that the relevant officials
are not trained or prepared to handle. Otherwise, the no-other-action condition
would simply be impossible to meet or, even worse, it would require ungrounded
experimentation on human societies.

98

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14

have varying degrees of probability short of certainty. Suppose that a
decision-maker is trying to find ways to preserve, as much as possible,
internal security or the population's overall access to some essential supplies. Suppose further that there are two major alternatives: one that is
clearly in breach of a BIT's obligations but that has a 50 percent
probability of attaining the public policy goal and another that is a priori
compatible with the BIT but that has only a 30 percent probability of
attaining the public policy goal. What alternative should the decisionmaker pursue?
It is submitted that, from a legal standpoint, the first alternative should
be followed. More fundamentally, the first alternative must be considered as meeting the "no-other-choice" condition. This rule stems from
the fact that, once a peremptory norm is at stake, every improvement in
the probability required to preserve the value enshrined in a peremptory
norm is not only desirable but also legally required. To further illustrate
this point, I could overstretch the example. If the first alternative, although in total breach of the BIT, had an 85 percent probability of preserving the value at stake, while the second alternative, although fully
compatible with the BIT, was only 80 percent sure of preserving the same
value, the state would still be legally required to pursue the first alternative. Admittedly, three main questions arise. First, how accurately can
we predict the probability of success of each policy alternative? Second,
should the principle proportionality have a bearing on the legal outcome
of this dilemma? Third, is this reasoning applicable when values enshrined in norms other than peremptory norms are at stake?
Regarding the first question, the answer is strictly technical. The outcomes of different public policies can be reasonably predicted. If this
claim was totally wrong, a whole province of contemporary social science,
including economics and econometrics, would be of little use. Of course,
it is not a matter of whether policy outcomes are predictable but whether
these predictions are accurate. Small margins of error such as 5 percent
(my second illustration) would, admittedly, be hardly persuasive. But
margins of 20 percent or more, for example, could not be simply neglected and should, in my view, be carefully taken into account, at least
when it comes to preserving values enshrined in peremptory norms. As
for the applicable accuracy standards, one possibility would be to refer to
those same standards used by the parties in their submissions on
damages.
Of course, answering my second question, the probabilities issue
should also bear on proportionality and, more precisely, in determining
compensation. Indeed, for example, a course of action with a slightly
higher probability of success but that entails a far more damaging outcome for foreign investors (as compared with other possible courses of
action), while still justified, may require fuller compensation for the damaged investors in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Conversely, when one course of action clearly stands out as the best option
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with respect to the protection of values enshrined in peremptory norms,
even if other courses of action would be less harmful to investors, compensation may be more limited. What is actually at stake is the idea that
there is room in article 27 of the ILC Articles for a specific form of comapportionment of the burden of loss acpensation based on a differing
59
cording to the circumstances.
Third, what if the value that the decision-maker is seeking to preserve
is not enshrined in a peremptory norm? Would my reasoning apply in the
exact same manner? To make things clearer, an example might help.
What would be the legal outcome if the decision-maker was seeking to
optimize another value, say economic prosperity or strategic interests,
which is not enshrined in a peremptory norm? I think the legal solutions
in this case should be different, to the point that Necessity would no
longer be applicable. 60 Viewed from the perspective of a hierarchy between the values (norms) at stake, insofar as a rule promoting (or protecting) the economic prosperity of the host country does not legally
override the obligations under the BIT, there is no question of Necessity
being applied. In other words, the first question to ask when facing an
allegation of Necessity is: what are the values at stake? If the host state is
not acting to preserve a value hierarchically superior to the one protected
by the BIT, then Necessity is excluded.
This reasoning leaves open, however, the question of how to analyze a
situation in which the host state is acting to preserve an essential interest
whose peremptory character is controversial. A possible example would
be environmental norms. 61 As a first step, the tribunal would have to
rule whether the interest that the host state was seeking to preserve
amounts to an essential interest or not. If it does not, Necessity would
simply be excluded. On the other hand, if the state interest is essential,
then the tribunal will, again, have to deal with the probabilities issue.
What is then the difference between this case and the one involving a
peremptory norm?
It is submitted that there are at least four differences. First, when a
peremptory norm is involved, the excusing effect of Necessity is larger; it
also overrides those cases in which an essential interest of the home state
59. See Ripinsky, supra note 39.

60. See discussion supra note 50 (for a brief discussion of foreign investment limitations in strategic industries).
61. As already noted, environmental interests are often contemplated in the text of a
BIT, so the hypothesis supposes that either in the instant case the BIT does not

include such clause or that there is a dispute as to the environmental interests
covered by such clause. The peremptory character of environmental norms was
suggested by article 19 of the former Draft Articles on State Responsibility (in
1996), which considered violations of international environmental norms as international crimes. Article 19 was much criticized and finally abandoned in the current version of the ILC Articles. In view of the current debate on environmental
issues, however, it is not totally unlikely that at least some environmental norms
will gain enough importance in the coming years or decades to become peremptory norms.
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is involved. 6 2 Second, when a peremptory norm is not at stake, the
probabilities issue should be appraised more restrictively. As a rule, a
peremptory norm admits no derogation and requires full preservation, to
every possible extent. Thus, from a legal standpoint, a decision-maker
should not be entitled to take any chance in seeking the full preservation
of such a norm. Third, the fact that peremptory norms must be upheld by
and are the concern of all states (while an essential interest may be the
egoistic concern of a single state) should be reflected in the computation
of damages. Compensation awards for breaches of a BIT stemming from
acts to preserve a value enshrined in a peremptory norm should, in my
view, be more limited. After all, if the same situation had arisen in the
state where the investor is based, such state would have had to act in a
similar fashion as the host state did, as peremptory norms serve to protect
the interests of (and thus are imperative for) all states. Moreover, it
stems from the very concept of peremptory norms that, in upholding a
peremptory norm, the breaching state was legally acting in the interest of
all states. Fourth, situations involving peremptory norms may render Necessity available in cases where essential interests that are not enshrined
in peremptory norms preclude its availability. For example, suppose that
a plant producing conventional weapons (investor) is based in state A,
which has concluded a BIT with state B (investor's home state). Now,
suppose that state A realizes that the weapons legally produced by the
investor are the main supply (through the intermediary of state B) of a
paramilitary group active in a bordering state (state C) responsible for
the commission of massive atrocities in total violation of peremptory
norms banning gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
Suppose further that state A takes action to prevent such exports and, in
so doing, breaches the obligations under its BIT with state B. Is state A
entitled to invoke Necessity? Technically, Necessity would not be ab initio excluded, for despite the fact the crisis is not in state A but rather in
state C, the preservation of values enshrined in peremptory norms is, by
definition, essential to all states. This is not the case of mere essential
interests. The critical issue to assess Necessity in this hypothesis would,
admittedly, be whether other courses of action were available to state A,
such as applying diplomatic pressure on state B or others. Here, again,
the probabilities issue would come into play. A tribunal assessing
whether Necessity could excuse the actions of state A will thus have to
focus, as seen before, on whether state A's decision-maker was entitled to
believe that the action taken was the best (even if not the only) course of
63
action to preserve the peremptory norms at stake.

62. See discussion supra Part II.
63. Action undertaken by state A may be covered by Necessity only insofar as it does
not itself breach a peremptory norm. For example, forceful intervention by state
A would be precluded by the peremptory norm banning the use of force.
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D.

LG&E

AND SPECIFIC NECESSITY

The decision of the arbitral tribunal in LG&E offers a good illustration
of how the excusing effect, although not expressly discussed, lurks behind
the hard choices made by the tribunal. I have already discussed both the
CMS and the LG&E awards and concluded that only the LG&E tribunal
clearly identified the value trade-off inherent to Necessity. I would like
to comment on the implicit underpinning of part of the LG&E tribunal's
reasoning with regard to Necessity.
The tribunal focuses its analysis of Necessity on article XI of the prevailing BIT and concludes that, between December 1, 2001 and April 26,
2003, the essential security interests of Argentina were threatened. 64 The
concepts of essential security interests and essential interests may cover
interests so essential as to be protected by peremptory norms. In the
specific context of the case, this reasoning would have been valid had
Argentina been, for example, under foreign military intervention. In the
matter at hand, however, it was far more difficult to determine whether
such a norm was at stake. This analysis is indeed difficult because, aside
from some widely-acknowledged norms, it is unclear which norms qualify
as peremptory norms. It was safer to use the more general concept of
essential interests, which is broader in scope. But among the different
values that the tribunal considered at stake, it mentioned that the crisis
threatened the satisfaction of basic human needs. 65 The tribunal did not
pursue this line of reasoning and concluded that this situation constituted
an indicator, among others, that the crisis was severe. In other words, the
tribunal only hinted at the idea that the preservation of values such as
minimal sanitary conditions for a large portion of the population should
override the obligations of Argentina under the BIT. Of course, such an
argument must be appraised with all due care, in light of the evidentiary
record. But what is interesting for purposes of this article is not the tribunal's conclusion but rather the road suggested by its reasoning.
Another relevant illustration of my remark is contained in the tribunal's assessment of the "no-other-choice" requirement. The LG&E tribunal has been criticized for placing on the claimants the burden of proof
that the Argentine government could have followed another course of
action. 66 While, traditionally, it is the defendant who must prove all the
conditions required for Necessity, a principle that could be applied by
analogy to clauses of Necessity in BITs, the reasoning of the tribunal
could still be explained satisfactorily by taking into account my remarks
on the probabilities issue. What the tribunal seeks to establish beginning
in paragraph 240 of the award seems to be that, given the circumstances,
the measures taken by the Argentine government were the best solution
to the crisis (although not with respect to investors) that the relevant officials could come up with. Again, the tribunal did not fully develop its line
64. LG&E Award, supra note 4, 231.
65. Id. 234.
66. Id. 242; see also Schill, supra note 6, at 265.
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of thought. But reading between the lines, there is some ground on which
to conclude that the tribunal took a pragmatic (as opposed to theoretical)
view of the available courses of action and acknowledged that the Argentine government took the one with the better probability of success. One
may object to this point both normatively and from the standpoint of
what one could conclude from the evidentiary record. Nevertheless, it
makes sense to admit that the first and foremost imperative when handling a severe crisis is to ensure that the top priorities are met, even if this
requires causing more harm to investors than other courses of action.
But this conclusion seems to be admissible only if these "top priorities"
are sufficiently legitimate, a condition clearly met when they involve preserving, as fully as possible, values enshrined in peremptory norms. This
latter point does not necessarily mean that a peremptory norm was at
stake in this specific case, but only that, should this be the case, the requirements needed to invoke Necessity would have to be adjusted to take
into account the nature of the interests at stake.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The preceding considerations suggest that acknowledging the excusing
effect of peremptory norms as part of the Necessity defense may in fact
considerably influence the way in which academics and practitioners understand and apply Necessity. As soon as it is admitted that the preservation of the values enshrined in peremptory norms represent an essential
interest in the sense attributed to this concept by the ILC Articles and
international customary law, a number of legal consequences follow. But
these consequences have not yet been fully explored. This article constitutes a preliminary attempt at conducting such exploration.
Indeed, if as this article argues, the concept of essential interests is a
legal concept that evolves with the development of international law,
then it would be difficult to reject the view that in contemporary international law, the concept covers interests enshrined in peremptory norms.
From the moment it is admitted that peremptory norms, as related to the
Necessity defense, may have not only a limiting effect but also an excusing effect, the understanding of Necessity changes in subtle though important ways. I have identified several ways in which this change is
noticeable. Let me summarize here the most important ones. First, my
analysis suggests that Necessity should be approached as a contest between two or more mutually exclusive (and hierarchically unbalanced)
values, a modus operandioften neglected. Second, once the excusing effect of peremptory norms is acknowledged, it becomes necessary to revisit the "no-other-choice" requirement of Necessity. This point also has
implications on the allocation of the onus probandi. Third, when the essential interests claimed by states are also enshrined in peremptory
norms, the Necessity defense might be potentially relevant in situations
that would have been excluded under the traditional understanding of
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this defense. Finally, the excusing effect of peremptory norms may have
implications regarding compensation issues.
Of course, as with every legal issue on which the concept of peremptory norms may bear, one of the main questions is, what norms qualify as
peremptory and with what consequences? When the concept of peremptory norms was first introduced in text of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, by analogy with domestic contract law, it was extremely
difficult to foresee the impact that it would have on other areas of international law in the future. 67 Today, however, peremptory norms benefit
from wide, although not total, 68 recognition. The case law of the ICJ has
welcomed the concept both in advisory opinions and in contentions cases.
This wide and increasing acceptance represents, no doubt, a formidable
legal development. But such an accomplishment will be of little use if its
implications remain obscure. In this context, the preceding analysis
should be seen as a preliminary contribution to understanding these implications on one specific point of law.

67. See Gaja, supra note 3, at 271.
68. See paragraph 3(a) of the comment by the Government of France to the ILC Draft
Articles on State Responsibility (in 1996), which states:
Article 19 of the draft articles, mentioned above, draws on the same idea
as jus cogens. If paragraph 2 of that article is read in the light of articles
53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it will
be noted that the concept of 'an international obligation so essential for
the protection of fundamental interests of the international community'
is very close to that of 'a peremptory norm of general international law'.
It is precisely because the 1969 Vienna Convention introduced a concept
of the law of treaties which was previously unknown and, what is more, is
dangerous for legal security, that France refused to sign that Convention.

For the reasons of principle stated above, the express references to jus
cogens in article 18, paragraph 2, article 29, paragraph 2, and article 50,
subparagraph (e), should be deleted.
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Draft Articles of the International Law
Commission on State Responsibility, Observations of France, § 3(a), http://www.
lcil.ac.uk/projects/state-responsibility-document-collection.php#5.
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